From the 1970s onwards, the OR community in Britain engaged in ongoing debate on the future of the discipline in the original context of an emerging 'crisis of confidence' engendered in part by the end of the 'golden age of western economic growth' and the associated downsizing, or abolition of practitioner groups in the corporate manufacturing sector. In addition, reservations were expressed concerning the increasing 'mathematization' of academic OR in the context of the established 'hard' or 'classical' paradigm. In this context, British operations researchers, aided and abetted by a minority of North American colleagues (notably Ackoff, Churchman and Miser) engaged in a fundamental reappraisal of the OR methodological repertoire and its client base. Thus, in Britain, a new phase in the history of OR was inaugurated whereby the 'positivist/scientist' approach bequeathed by the wartime pioneers was subject to challenge and qualification. Whilst some elements in the North American OR community empathized with the emergent British critique, the response (notwithstanding Ackoff et al) was, on the whole, relatively muted. This conservative American response provides one part of the rationale for this paper. The key issue here is to compare and contrast the tone and content of the Anglo-American debate on the future of OR after 1970: in simple terms, why did British OR practitioners and academics (especially the latter) respond so vigorously to the post-1970 OR critique in marked contrast to their North American counterparts? In explaining the differential response, the paper will emphasize the interplay between an array of political and economic factors.
Introduction
In 2000, I published a paper (Ki rby, 2000) which provided contrasts and comparisons between the development of operations research (OR) in Britain and the USA in the so-called 'golden age' -the 30 years after 1940 when diffusion into the military sector was followed by the incorporation of OR into an increasingly wide range of civilian organizations in the public and private sectors. In addition, the period was notable for the dissemination of an expanding repertoire of American-derived methodological techniques which proved capable of delivering substantial efficiency gains to the organizations to which they were applied. The techniques themselves proved to be eminently teachable so that by 1970 OR, both in Britain and the USA, was viewed as an entirely legitimate subject for academic discourse and enquiry in the university sector. This positive trajectory underpinned the agenda for my research monograph on the history of OR in Britain (from the 1930s to 1970), published in 2003 (Kirby, 2003a) . However, notwithstanding the substantial achievements of the 'golden age', the book could not fail to end without a postscript on the 'crisis' that began to afflict the British OR community in the 1970s, and subsequently its North American counterpart in the 1980s and 1990s. I am now writing a second volume which will cover the period from 1970 to 2000. Inevitably, the book begins where volume one concluded -with an analysis of the critical debates after 1970 and their interface with comparative developments in the USA. In that context, the purpose of this paper is threefold. In the first instance, it identifies the essential features of the original 'crisis' debate in Britain as a prelude to a more detailed analysis of the intellectual stance of the 'reformist' and 'revolutionary' critics of the Americandriven 'hard' or 'classical' paradigm. Section two contains two distinctive elements.
In the first instance, it argues that the notion of 'crisis' was fundamentally misconceived insofar as it emanated from a minority of British academic operations researchers who presented a distorted, if not ill-informed, view of OR in practice. It then highlights the intellectual and cultural, as well as the political and economic factors, which motivated the critics of the hard paradigm, emphasizing that significant aspects of their critique were rooted in time-specific historical circumstances. The final substantive section relates these developments to North American experience after 1980.
The 'Crisis' in British Operations Research and the Critical Response
Whilst the notion of 'crisis' in OR emerged first in Britain, one of the most intelligent and succinct summaries of its critical elements (as they subsequently appeared in the USA) was provided by the American operations researcher, Pierre Hansen, in an article published in 1989 (Hansen, 1989) . Here, Hansen identified the following constituent factors:
a) The 'perversion theory': the increasing focus of OR on techniques meant that managerial needs were ignored.
b) The 'obsolescence theory': the techniq ues themselves, whilst highly applicable to the production needs of the 'golden age', had reached their limits of usefulness.
c) The 'inadequacy theory': as the 'golden age' of economic growth gave way to increasing macro-economic turbulence after 1970, managerial needs became more complex rendering the hard, or classical paradigm increasingly irrelevant.
d) The 'counter-performance theory': the practice of OR had been 'misguided', thereby undermining managerial confidence in its ability to inform decision making whether at the tactical or strategic levels.
Of the above categories of concern, the only one which requires elaboration at this point is the 'counter-performance' theory. The critical issue here is the extent to which failures in OR practice contributed to the emergent crisis by undermining managerial confidence in the discipline. In Britain, the best example of this is the fate of OR in British Petroleum (BP), a multinational company which, during the course of the 1960s, had modelled its global operations on the basis of increasingly complex linear programming models. All of this was dispensed with in the wake of the 1973-4 oil crisis which revealed in the starkest possible terms that the 'giantism' inherent in the OR models of the later 1960s was credible only when related to stable energy prices (Kirby, 2003a) .
Further insights into the OR 'crisis', at least as it was portrayed in Britain, were provided by Dando and Bennett, writing in the early 1980s (Dando and Bennett, 1981) . In invoking the theme of a 'Kuhnian' crisis in British OR -in the sense that 'the dominant framework of assumptions appears to fail in relation to important problems' -the authors began by identifying a threefold classification of the methodology of OR as it had evolved from its inception in the later 1930s up to the 1970s. The first variant was the long-established 'classical' or 'positivist/quantitative' paradigm, rooted in the established 'methods of science'. The second variant was the new 'reformist school', supposedly represented by the American operations researcher, Russell Ackoff, whilst the third variant was the 'revolutionary' critique of both the classical paradigm and the reformist school developed by a minority of British academic OR scientists in the 1970s. In an earlier paper, I analyzed Ackoff's intellectual trajectory given his original status as an apostle of OR and his ultimate apostasy (Kirby, 2003b) . I identified three 'way stations' in the evolution of Ackoff's stance on the theory and practice of OR. Thus, in the early 1970s he developed critical insights into the interaction between systems thinking and human behaviour (Ackoff and Emery, 1972) : if individual systems are 'purposive', it follows that knowledge and understanding of their aims can only be obtained by taking into account the mechanisms of social, cultural and psychological systems.
According to Ackoff, these systems were undergoing radical change as the 'Machine Age' gave way to the 'Systems Age'. The Machine Age, the produc t of industrialisation, was supported by two interrelated concepts -'reductionism', in the sense that everything can be decomposed into indivisible parts -and 'mechanism', embracing cause and effect relationships. For Ackoff, the termination of the Machine Age was signalled in the 1940s when philosophers, mathematicians and biologists defined the intellectual framework of the new systems approach, defined by Ackoff as follows:
A system is more than the sum of its parts; it is an indivisible whole. It loses its essential properties when it is taken apart. The elements of a system may themselves by systems, and every system may be part a larger system (Ackoff, 1973) .
The post-1945 onset of the systems age gave rise to new forms of engineering practice and new sciences of management, including OR, cybernetics, systems engineering and the communications sciences. Insofar as these interrelated developments held out the prospect of interdisciplinary research, mankind's ability to understand mounting complexity and volatility would be enhanced. The promise, however, remained unfilled principally because the three postwar decades were characterised by increasing introversion giving rise to jurisdictional disputes between disciplines.
Thus, by the early 1970s a narrow and inward looking OR community was insufficiently broad-based to define a research agenda relevant to the enhancement of the human condition. For Ackoff, the most pressing problems included discrimination, inequality and the inefficiency of public services. In these contexts, Machine Age thinking was seriously compromised in the sense that it could not comprehend the 'messes' of unstructured reality: traditional OR models were selflimiting, if only because they were rooted in excessively complicated mathematics (Ackoff, 1973 ).
Ackoff's second 'way station' offered a further condemnation of OR in theory and practice. In two trenchant papers, published in 1977 ( Ackoff, 1977a and 1977b) he argued that OR's unrelenting focus on 'optimization' and 'objectivity' was conducive to 'opt-out', or a withdrawal from reality. In an increasingly turbulent economic and political environment 'it is silly to look for an optimal solution to a mess'. As for 'objectivity', Ackoff rejected the view that it could only be achieved by excluding the moral and ethical values held by the researchers involved. Ackoff therefore argued that objectivity cannot be the absence of value judgements in purposeful behaviourbecause purposeful behaviour cannot be value free: in his own words, 'there is no concept as value loaded as objectivity, and no activity more value-full than science'.
Ackoff's final, and most controversial way-station was described in two papers delivered to the British Operational Research Society's annual conference in 1978 (Ackoff 1979a (Ackoff , 1979b systems approach which would serve to marginalize the malign influence of the everincreasing 'mathematisation' of OR. As he had stated earlier, the 'messes' of unstructured reality were being murdered by reducing them to problems, which were then murdered by reducing them to models, which in turn were murdered by excessive mathematics (Ackoff, 1973) .
In the later 1980s, Ackoff provided further insights into the reasons for his apostasy (Ackoff, 1987) . By that time he took the view that in its production and distribution 'output-oriented guise', the classical OR paradigm had become wholly irrelevant to the resolution of problems of choice in the post-'golden age' era of intensifying competition, both at home and abroad. Unable to explain 'purposeful choices', operations researchers were increasingly marginalized and downgraded in organizations as top management concentrated increasingly on marketing rather than the production-led problems characteristic of the 'golden age'. Ackoff's solution to the OR 'crisis', therefore, was to proclaim the need for operations researchers to collaborate with managerial decision makers in order to remove or resolve conflict in such a way as to serve the interests of all stakeholders in an organization -bearing in mind that the 'organization' may be far removed from the corporate boardroom.
There was, in effect, a moral responsibility on operations researchers to advocate, either directly or indirectly, the concerns of all stakeholders (Ackoff, 1977a (Ackoff, , 1977b  see also Churchman and Schainblatt, 1965, and Muller-Merbach, 1988) .
As an alleged reformer, Ackoff had his contemporary and earlier British counterparts with a record of publications and practical work dating back to the 1960s (Stringer, 1967; Friend and Jessop, 1969; Friend, Norris and Stringer, 1988; Eden, Jones and Sims, 1979) . Borrowing from the methodology of 'social science', the early British reformers were conversant with Ackoff's approach insofa r as they were intent upon applying OR to the needs of 'multi-organizations' such as local government and the National Health Service. More to the point -and in conformity with Ackoff's emergent methodology -they placed particular emphasis on 'action research'. In practice this meant that a social science approach was adopted 'almost by osmosis' in the negotiation and management of change (Stringer, 1967) .
In the British context, one of the most well known reformers, insofar as he questioned the universal applicability of the classical paradigm, was Peter Checkland,
Professor of Systems at the University of Lancaster from 1969 until his retirement in 1997. In developing his critique of the established paradigm Checkland noted that its essential methodological basis was rooted in model-building whereby a surrogate of the real world could be manipulated to conduct experiments and the results transferred to the real world (Checkland, 1981 (Ormerod, 2005) .
From the early 1980s onwards, Checkland, building on the work of earlier British reformers, emerged as a leading exponent of 'soft systems methodology' (SSM) as a response to the alleged limitations of the classical paradigm (Checkland, 1981) . In this respect, Checkland was concerned to acknowledge his debt not only to Ackoff, but also to Vickers, writing in 1965 (Vickers, 1965 , and Churchman in 1971 (Churchman, 1971) . All three developed a 'systems' approach to the resolution of managerial problems which could be deemed to be 'wicked' (Rittel and Webber, 1973) or 'messes' (Ackoff, 1975) . It was in this context that Checkland and his colleagues developed SSM to be applied to 'management situations in which objectives were….problematical and the engineering/optimizing of the approaches developed in the 1950s and 1960s could not be used unchanged'. Thus, the critical difference between the classical paradigm and SSM was the manner in which they deployed systems ideas. As Checkland observed,
The soft approaches…. do not assume that systemicity lies in the world. Their assumption is that whatever the real world consists of (on which they are neutral), the process of inquiry into the world can be organized as a learning system. Thus in SSM the system is the process of inquiry itself -though SSM also happens to make use of systems models of purposeful activity, though these are not would-be descriptions of anything in the world, only devices to structure the debate (Checkland, 2001 ; italics in original).
It is important to note, however, that in his capacity as a reformer Checkland was concerned to emphasize that the classical paradigm and SSM were complementary to each other to the extent that they were 'powerful' in combination. Marxist perception of economy and society which, by definition, was directly at odds with Ackoff's consensua l stance, it is not surprising that there were some sharp exchanges in the literature (Chesterton, Goodsman, Rosenhead and Thunhurst, 1975; Ackoff, 1975; Rees, 1976; Rosenhead, 1976) . One of the most polemical contributions -in the sense that it deployed explicit Marxist terminology -stemmed from Rosenhead and Thunhurst. The relevant article, published in the early 1980s (Rosenhead and Thunhurst, 1982) , makes fascinating, if not humorous, reading at this distance in time in the light of the rightwards shift in British politics inaugurated by Margaret Thatcher after 1979 and its dramatic impact on the Labour Party in opposition before its re-election to government in 1997. In this respect, it is instructive to quote selectively from Rosenhead and Thunhurst's article:
From the earliest days [of capitalism], the organized workforce has resisted [management exploitation] in fierce and sometimes locally successful struggles. But in the struggle between management (who act in this respect as agents of capital) and labour, the initiative has lain with management. On its behalf theories have been developed and techniques introduced in steady succession. The result has been the battery of sciences on which management now relies for the design and control of the work-process and the control of the workforce. These include time-and-motion study, production engineering and ergonomics (also called human engineering), as well as the various schools of industrial psychology, industrial sociology and organization theory. This proliferation of specialisms can be seen simultaneously as elements in a Taylorist offensive, and as managerial tactics aiming to head-off the workers' passive or active response.
Operational research is one of these management sciences. And both these tendencies -to control the workplace and to control the response -are present within it. It is part of the forces of production (the resources and knowledge at the disposition of society to make use of nature) which under capitalism are the means by which the work -force is more efficiently exploited; and it is part of the ideological superstructure, the dominant system of ideas which dictate that the workers must accept the conditions of their exploitation (Rosenhead and Thunhurst, 1982 . Italics added).
Thus, classical OR was profoundly ideological in that it 'suppresses open discussion and consideration of ends and values in favour of a technical selection of efficient means. It trades on the label "scientific" to justify particular, instrumental values' (Mingers, 1992) . For Rosenhead and Thunhurst and their fellow Marxist sympathisers it was self evident that Ackoff's approach -and by implication, Checkland's SSM -was unable to comprehend the inevitable power struggles that afflict hierarchical organizations. Ackoff's advocacy of consensual interactive planning, where all stakeholders subscribe to a shared community of interests could therefore be viewed as naïve in the sense that 'some issues never reach the agenda for debate', whilst some groups can be duped by 'false consciousness' leading to the marginalizing of their concerns (Flood and Jackson, 1991) . Somewhat predictably, the revolutionaries called for the British OR community to replace its overwhelming commitment to the corporate boardroom and the controlling mechanisms of the capitalist (corporate) state in order to serve the needs of the exploited workforce -in effect, replacing 'management science' with a nascent 'workers' science' (Thunhurst, 1973; Hales, 1974; Chesterton, Goodsman, Rosenhead and Thunhurst, 1975; Rosenhead, 1976) .
In terms of its longevity, the historical record confirms that in its British context, the challenge to the classical paradigm was sustained not by the revolutionaries or, indeed, by Ackoff but by the reformers. This is in conformity with the predictions of Dando and Bennett who concluded that the reformist position 'will probably be far easier for the OR community to understand and accept than the revolutionary paradigm which is so far from their normal modes of thought' (Dando and Bennett, 1981 ; italics in original). Indeed, as the 1980s gave way to the 1990s increased sophistication in reformist thought was evident within the British OR community, most notably within the university sector. This was the product of cross-fertilization of ideas in the literature, conference presentations and working together on group projects. Thus, by 2000, it was possible to refer to 'problem structuring methods'
(PSMs) as a recognized complement to the classical paradigm. Designed to deal with decision making procedures where there was profound 'complexity' and 'uncertainty', PSMs accept as a fact that the most demanding and troubling task in formative decision systems is to decide what the problem is. There are too many factors; many of the relationships between them are unclear or are in dispute; the most important do not reduce naturally to quantified form; different stakeholders have different priorities. Problem structuring methods use models (often in the plural and and with little or no quantification) to help mostly group decision-making -since it is rare for such issues to be resolved by single decision makers. The model representations are used to provide enough structure that those who must take responsibility for the consequences of the choices which are made , do so on a coherent basis and with sufficient confidence to make the necessary commitments (Rosenhead and Mingers, 2001) .
From this it follows that
PSMs realize their potential most fully in use with groups in work-shop format, That is, meeting without formal agenda or chairing but with a shared commitment to making progress to the issue at hand. Indeed, PSMs have been called 'wide--band group decision support systems', where 'wide-band' indicates the ir ability to handle problems that have not been pre-formulated and may have quite diverse structures (Rosenhead and Mingers, 2001 ).
Somewhat ironically, the first attempt to produce a coherent volume to describe and advocate PSMs was undertaken by one of the original revolutionaries, Rosenhead in 1989 (Rosenhead, 1989 Company, the application of 'community' OR in favour of an ex-coalminers' council housing estate, the devising of a national system for the transport of hazardous waste on behalf of the Netherlands Government, and the development of an IT strategy for Sainbury's plc as a major player in the British retail supermarket sector (Rosenhead and Mingers, 2001 , table 1.1, p. 10).
In overall terms, this 'alternative' paradigm for OR could be distinguished from its classical counterpart in terms of 'subjectivity' versus 'objectivity' -in effect a methodological response to the uncertainties ushered in by the end of the 'golden age'. It can be argued that the inclusion of Checkland's SSM within the approved methodological repertoire, together with chapters addressing the needs of corporate enterprise, is indicative of the maturity of the alternative paradigm in terms of the post-1990 rapprochement between the so-called reformers and the upholders of the classical paradigm. Indeed, Rosenhead and Mingers were as keen as Checkland to emphasize the complementarity between the alternative paradigm and the traditional modelling techniques bequeathed by the Blackett-inspired pioneers of OR. Thus, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, in spite of the Ackoff-driven critique and the original depradations of the revolutionaries, the classical paradigm remains as a key OR tool in that it continues to provide well-founded solutions to a myriad of complex problems confronting 'financial institutions, extractive and manufacturing industry, airlines and rail companies -and …. society as a whole' (Rosenhead and Mingers, 2001 ). Moreover, as the following section will demonstrate, classical OR in practice proved sufficiently flexible to assimilate elements of soft OR methodology as part of an expanding 'toolkit' of techniques. This is verified by the post-1980 contents lists of the major British journals, and also by the delivery of academic and practitionerbased papers at the principal national and international conferences in the discipline.
It is also the case that whilst there has been a decline in the number of corporate 'inhouse' OR groups (Fildes and Ranyard, 1997) , this has been offset substantially by 'A new model of highly specific investigations and developments conducted by external specialist firms and management consultancies' (Ormerod, 1999 ; see also Ormerod, 1998) . In all of these respects, the practitioner-turned academic operations researcher, Richard Ormerod has commented appositely that not withstanding the agonizing debates of the 1970s and early 1980s, Blackett's child is alive and well. In some sense it has reached and passed its maturity. This should be no surprise 50 years on. The [OR] profession was for a time the centre of managerial attention. It had its golden era. It is now a small professional grouping that has found its niche. Few people realise that [OR] lies behind many every day events, providing the algorithms for airline reservations, checking the creditworthiness of loan applicants and calculating the replenishment quantities required by supermarkets. Despite its important role in today's society [OR] lacks pomposity, it includes many, diverse interests and has demonstrated a certain capacity for survival. We would all wish as much for our own children (Ormerod, 1999) .
PARADIGM CHANGE AFTER 1970: BACKGROUND FACTORS
Clearly, the period after 1970 witnessed a mounting critique of the classical paradigm in Britain both on the part of reformers and revolutionaries. Yet the paradigm has survived, largely unscathed, whilst its essential elements continue to be valued by practitioners and academics alike. In this section, I wish to highlight some possible reasons for this. The discussion is informed by three reflective papers in JORS, the first by Ormerod (Ormerod, 1996) , the second, by Munro and Mingers (Munro and Mingers, 2002) and the third by Brockelsby (Brockelsby, 1995) . The section is also methodology as dictated by the accepted canons of scientific inquiry (Kirby, 2003a) .
Notwithstanding the continuing claims that OR was/is a science-based discipline,
Ormerod commented as follows:
The assumption that the scientific world makes progress through the diligent use of an inductive-deductive method….has been under sustained attack by those interested in the nature of science, including both scientists themselves and philosophers of science. Some argue for changes to the logical underpinnings of the scientific method, others recognize that the scientific method requires explanation as a social and historical rather than a purely logical process. The social and historic accounts of the logic of science served to cast doubt on the rational-empirical claims of science (Ormerod, 1996, p.2) .
Whilst operations researchers of the stature of Ravetz (Ravetz, 1971 ) and Miser (Miser, 1991) continued to defend OR's scientific status, the assault on the nature of 'science' gave pause for thought in the British OR community, especially on the part of academic members of the discipline (Keys 1989 (Keys , 1998 . In a second section,
Ormerod summarized the view, extant in the 1970s (and providing the basis for Ackoff's critique), that OR had become technique-oriented to the extent that operations researchers were increasingly downgraded in managerial hierarchies in their limited capacity as technicians. This is a well-rehearsed theme (Eilon, 1977 (Eilon, , 1980 and my earlier comments have set it in a long-term historical perspective.
More interesting for this paper is Ormerod's focus on the links between OR and the social sciences. As he commented of the 1960s, At the same time as the nature of science was being redefined, social scientists were questioning the applicability of the methods of natural science to social questions. The concerns here were as much instrumental as philosophical. Could the methods of natural science be applied to social situations without trivializing the very object of inquiry, the human element? The approach of science was found to be wanting when it came to capturing the subtleties of a situation where different meanings could be attached to social actions, not least by the subjects themselves. Attempts to use the methods of science to define social attributes and the relationship between them could only give a partial picture and in the eyes of many a very inadequate one (Ormerod, 1996, p. 4) .
Thus, the 'increasingly coherent development of the social sciences' fulfilled an important role in fuelling the critique of the classical paradigm insofar as it provided an essential underpinning for the advocates of the alternative paradigm and its associated 'soft' methodology.
Although Ormerod was concerned to draw attention to the broad influences that helped to undermine the validity of OR's historic claim to scientific status, he was equally determined to correct the view, expounded in the revolutionary literature, and reinforced by some of the reformers, that OR in practice was singularly based upon the optimization inherent in American-derived mathematical models. Thus, Ormerod drew on his accumulated expertise as a former member of the most successful OR practitioner group in British industry to emphasize that in his experience OR practice was never as unthinkingly conducted as the reformers and revolutionaries implied.
As he has stated with respect to his experience in the Operational Research Executive within the nationalized coal industry in the 1970s, the amount of optimization going on was vanishingly small. The main technique used was simulation but even that was dominated by investigations that didn't involve techniques. Part of the problem in understanding the practice of OR lies in the 'mathematical masturbation' of some academics and a desire to provide a social science critique [on the part] of others (Ormerod, 2004b Standard mathematical techniques or their immediate extensio n are rarely applicable [in practice]….This is borne out by surveys among past students, the majority of whom, even several years after graduation, have never used queuing theory, linear programming or the rest….The techniques themselves reflect and embody the underlying structures of commonly occurring processes. …Quite apart from [operations researchers] being aware both of the potential and limitations of formal mathematical ways of handling problems of a given structure, I believe that a thorough appreciation of the techniques enables one much better to understand (or even to recognize) the existence of the underlying form (Simpson, 1978) .
It is a supreme irony that Simpson's hymn of praise to methodological pragmatism was delivered to the same conference at which Ackoff had chosen to present his attack on the OR community for its obsession with mathematical virtuosity and practical irrelevance (see above). , 1986) . The rationale for the report was provided by the ongoing notion of 'crisis' in OR, but more especially by the downsizing or closure of some inhouse corporate groups which followed in the wake of the economic recession of the early 1980s. Thus, the main concern of the report was to sustain and support the practitioner community 'in meeting the challenges of the last fifteen years of the twentieth century'. In relation to the theme of this paper, the most pertinent comments are contained in the section entitled 'Methodology of O.R. in Practice'. It is worthwhile quoting selectively from this section:
The Commission found that most practitioners subscribe to the view that O.R. in practice uses, or seeks to use, methodology of a kind which would be endorsed by the scientific community….Phrases like 'logical analysis', 'developing understanding through modelling' and 'basing belief on factual evidence' were frequently used by practitioners to describe O.R.'s methodology. Beyond these generalities and the frequent use of statistical methods, the Commission found little by way of a definable uniform methodology. (p. 842).
The Commission therefore rejected the caricature of OR in practice as presented by the reformers and revolutionaries alike. More to the point, The Commission also found little explicit use of those mathematical techniques which are most commonly associated with O.R. (for example, mathematical programming and queuing theory). These and the insights they offer, along with many other technical devices, help constitute a tool-kit of methods from which the practitioner may draw as need dictates. From time to time some potentially widely applicable tool is developed, either in the O.R. community or elsewhere, which many practitioners decide to add to their kit (p. 842).
In this light, the Commission concluded that the 'main methodological drive' in the practitioner community was 'pragmatism':
Subject to a regard for the wider dictates of scientific probity, practitioners use the methodology and the tools, or methods, which meet the needs of the case as quickly as possible. These needs often include that the methodology and the tools should be understood by, and otherwise be acceptable to the client. The means by which these needs are met usually entail working closely with the client or his representative, and almost continuous negotiation, stage by stage, of how the work should be moving. Only rarely does O.R. move straight from problem to solution (p. 842).
In relation to the methodological stance of O.R. and its implications for practice, the Commission therefore found that 'change is endemic', implying that practitioners needed to be 'adaptive, opportunistic, articulate and sensitive to the political and In highlighting the intellectual debate on the respective merits of the classical paradigm versus SSM and PSMs, a necessary complement is an assessment of the impact on OR practice of the alternative, 'soft', paradigm. This section of the paper is therefore informed by Munro and Minger's recent survey of the use of hard and soft methodologies in Britain in the three decades after 1970 (Munro and Mingers, 2002) .
In invoking the concept of 'multimethodology' the authors were concerned to analyse the extent to which the availability of hard and soft methods had been conducive to a pluralistic methodological approach rooted in pragmatism. Notwithstanding their conclusion that the application of 'multimethodology' has been a 'common occurrence' -to the extent that 'SSM is distinctive in that it appears to be the predominant methodology used as part of multimethodology, in combination with other [traditional] techniques', the authors emphasized that their survey of OR in practice indicated that 'There are few combinations of hard and soft together' (p.378).
Furthermore, in response to a critical comment by Ormerod (Ormerod, 2004a ), Munro and Mingers confirmed that their original survey of OR practitioners had revealed that only 10 per cent had used SSM (Munro and Mingers, 2004) . More to the point, they emphasized that their survey was consistent with the conclusion that the use of SSMs was largely confined to the academic community, albeit in a consultancy capacity, whereas practitioners 'tended to use simulation, statistical analysis, mathematical modelling and forecasting most frequently in combination ' (p. 94) . Taking all of this into account, Ormerod has observed that
We are twenty years into these [soft] methods. It is difficult to believe that they are going to penetrate now. The impact has been remarkably slight. A pity, I think, because….they are useful and I advocate their use. But there it is: OR practice manages its problem structuring, intervention approach and relationships with the client….largely without the help of soft approaches (Ormerod, 2004b ). ….the transition from hard to soft systems thinking triggers fundamental changes in both the content and the style of the intervention. The primary task switches from problem solving to problem structuring; system optimisation is replaced by iterative learning, engineering consensus and system 'improvement'; the interest domain shifts from objective 'facts' to subjectivities and multiple rationalities; the discipline base shifts from mathematics to the social sciences, models of perceptions replace models of real world entities; implied metaphors are political system and culture instead of machine and organism (p. 1290).
Insofar as paradigm change on this scale would require 'changes at the level of beliefs and assumptions, as well as at the artefact level', the fundamental difficulties are readily apparent. Ingrained habits and entrenched patterns of thought must be laid aside. Indeed, an entire belief system may require abolition, and presumably, sooner rather than later. Such changes have occurred, albeit extremely rarely, but as Brockelsby observed, 'long-held basic assumptions, "root" metaphors and values, have a habit of retaining their sub-conscious influence even under circumstances in which they have been publically repudiated' (p. 1290). To put it bluntly, paradigm change can be extremely painful if long-held beliefs and assumptions are to be surrendered. It follows, therefore, that such action will not be taken lightly.
Brockelsby's remarks provide interesting insights into the muted, if not hostile reception, given to Ackoff's controversial papers of the late 1970s (Ackoff, 1979a (Ackoff, , 1979b . His interpretation of the 'crisis' is consistent with the view that the alternative paradigm was bound to have limited impact on the theory and practice of OR in view of the considerable vested interests in sustaining the classical paradigm.
In concluding this section, I wish to draw attention to the time-specific political and economic factors which gave special poignancy to the emergent critique of the classical paradigm in Britain. In this respect, I quote from a paper already cited -Rosenhead and Thunhurst's 'revolutionary' appeal for OR to embrace the concept of a 'workers' science':
Capitalism is in crisis. Rampant inflation, long dole queues, cuts in public expenditure and social services, factory shut-downs and la yoffs, shrinkage of capital investment and of profit margins, and the chaos of the last ten and especially five years in the arrangements for financing world trade are all symptoms of different stages of the world-wide crisis. But the boom-slump mechanism is an integral part of the process by which capitalism periodically rejuvenates itself -bypassing, transcending or crushing obstacles to its further development. Whether the current crisis will follow this pattern, or will threaten the very existence of capitalism, can still only be a matter of speculation. But the crisis is clearly of unusual length and severity and is world-wide in scope. Alongside the economic crisis there is also a crisis of legitimation -an unwillingness among large sectors of the population to accept passively the conditions of their labour and their social existence (Rosenhead and Thunhurst, 1982) .
This article was published in 1982 but the main focus of its temporal coverage relates to macro and micro-economic events in the previous decade which played a crucial role in precipitating the 'crisis' debate. As an economic historian of post-1900
Britain, I can elaborate on the Rosenhead-Thunhurst agenda by placing the decade of the 1970s in its appropriate historical context. In the British context, the main features of the decade can be summarized as follows:
1. The slowest rate of economic growth since the early 1900s and exceptionally poor growth performance in the context of the leading developed economies.
2. A period which witnessed the loss of more than 2 million jobs in the manufacturing sector, giving rise to a major debate on the causes and consequences of 'deindustrialisation'. 4. Failures in macroeconomic policy intensifying an existing 'boom and bust' cycle, the product of unprecedented growth in the money supply and the public sector borrowing requirement.
5. A major exchange rate crisis in 1976 when the government of the day was obliged to seek the support of the IMF on terms which were viewed as 'humiliating' and certainly consistent with the IMF's policy of responding to the monetary needs of 'third-world' countries.
6. A governing party (Labour after 1974) which conceded considerable political influence to the trade union movement at the same time as a substantial proportion of the parliamentary party moved decisively to the left in its economic and social policy stance.
7. The inflationary consequences of the OPEC-administered oil-price hike in 1973-4, bearing in mind that the British inflation rate in the mid-1970s was by far the highest among OECD countries.
8. A sense of mounting political concern about the future of the British state itself (reflected in journal and newspaper articles on the theme, 'Is Britain becoming ungovernable'?) in view of the rise of trade union militancy and nationalist political parties in the Welsh and Scottish 'Celtic' fringe. The endemic problem of Northern Ireland was also at its height.
9. The collapse of the post-1945 consensus on economic policy whereby the maintenance of full employment was replaced by the control of inflation as the overriding policy objective.
For Britain, therefore, the 'golden age' of western economic growth ended with a vengeance and it is the above circumstances which provide the broad background to the emergence of the alternative OR paradigm.
In retrospect, however, the 1970s appear as an aberration in British economic history. In that decade there was widespread concern that the British economy, and even the state itself (defined in terms of the 'United Kingdom'), were in terminal decline for the reasons stated. The fact remains, however, that the prognostications of the pessimists, both reformers and revolutionaries, were not realized. The As a joint OR Society-Tavistock initiative, the remit of the IOR was to engage in 'active partnership with social scientists, since their discipline was concerned with whole organisations, and seeks policies which are best for the whole rather than for the individual parts of an organisation' (cited in Kirby, 2003a ; italics in the original).
As indicated earlier (see above, p. ), the early British reformers located in the IOR, pre-dating Checkland, but with the support of Ackoff, proved to be among the earliest advocates of 'soft' OR approaches. The point to be made in this context is that even before the 'crisis' debates of the 1970s, British OR had begun to diversify its methodological foundations beyond the classical paradigm. This fact in itself provides a further, and plausible, insight into the muted reaction to the post-1970 reformers and revolutionaries alike.
THE NORTH AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
I can do no better in this section of the paper than begin with a brief assessment of the American reaction to Ackoff's rejection of the classical paradigm, bearing in mind that he was the leading American advocate of 'soft' OR. In the paper that I delivered to the INFORMS conference in 1998, I compared and contrasted the differing trajectories of OR in Britain and America in the 50 years after 1945 (Kirby, 2000) .
Inevitably, I touched on the 'crisis' debate in both countries, citing numerous contributions to the issue by British and American authors. In re-reading the paperand bearing in mind that the theme of 'crisis' was perpetuated in the US long after its demise in Britain -I am impressed by the extent to which Ackoff's original diagnosis of the decline and fall of OR was accepted, albeit with differing slants. Thus, while
Ackoff referred to the 'devolution' of OR in the sense of its downgrading in managerial structures, Corbett and Van Wassenhove identified the phenomenon of 'natural drift' (Corbett and Van Wassenhove, 1993) . This focused on the increasing inability of operations researchers (as the advocates of 'a practically relevant discipline') to engage the attention of managers. Like Ackoff, Reisnick and Kirschnik also referred to the 'devolution' of OR and drew attention to the number of papers in 'flagship' journals rooted in 'untested theory ' (Reisnick and Kirschnik, 1994) ). All of this resonated with Abbott's hypothesis of 'professional regression' whereby the pre-eminence of the mathematical paradigm was both inevitable and irreversible in view of the existence of 'a small but very elite core' enjoying 'intellectual control over a much wider jurisdiction' (Abbott, 1988 (Fildes and Ranyard, 1997) . Whilst the resulting report, published in 1997, noted that the closure of in-house groups was clearly related to managerial downsizing arising from the onset of economic recession in the early 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, it also pointed to the following broader influences:
1. 'Deindustrialisation' as a long term trend was bound to have an adverse impact on the number of OR groups in corporate manufacturing.
2. The increasing standardisation of modelling languages and the development of standard PC packages undermined the role of OR groups as 'gatekeepers to solving problems dependent on the IT function'.
3. Post-1970 managerial style and culture became increasingly antipathetic to 'rational analysis', favouring a post-modern 'holistic response to a problem rather than one based on decomposition and the explicit analysis of alternative options.
4 . The abandonment of 'normative models of rationality' could well be 'a reflection of an increasingly widespread belief that a coherent corporate ideology focused on the organization's mission is more valuable than the questioning methods of decision rationality'.
5. The failure of OR groups to respond positively to changes in management culture -as represented by the 'Quality Movement' and 'Business Process Re-engineering' -lead to the penetration of 'alternative consultants, internal or external'.
5. One of the key functions of a central OR group is to reconcile 'conflicting objectives across different businesses and functional areas'. To the extent that this was consistent with 'top-down management of a portfolio of businesses', the mounting scepticism of the value added by centrally provided services resulted in the dispersal of OR leading to the loss of 'professional identity' and 'critical mass'.
There is evidence that a number of these influences were at work in the United States after 1970. For example, Geoffrion writing in the early 1990s, noted that the obvious term to describe the process of OR in industry was 'dispersed' in the sense that the 'long-term net decentralization and disbanding of MS/OR groups' from the late 1960s onwards meant that OR in practice was conducted mainly 'by individuals in myriad types of staff groups and functional areas' (Geoffrion, 1992) . In explaining the demise of internal OR groups, Geoffrion identified the following interrelated factors:
1. OR/MS groups are susceptible to cost cutting in response to 'lack of functional responsibility', especially if 'senior management champions' move on.
2. The move towards 'leaner staffs in headquarters, flatter organizational structures and greater decentralization' had resulted in the dispersion of central OR/MS groups.
3. Standard OR/MS techniques had diffused into other disciplines and professions, notably 'actuarial science, applied mathematics, computer science, finance, industrial and other kinds of engineering, logistics, marketing and operations management'. This had undermined the uniqueness of central groups thereby encouraging the use of OR/MS ideas by other professionals.
4. The diffusion of OR/MS computer software had augmented the above process.
5. In its early days OR/MS had enjoyed a 'bandwagon effect' which had dissipated. This meant that it was increasingly unlikely that OR/MS was going to attract the attention of senior managers.
6. Although OR/MS groups had enjoyed 'strategic impact', too much of their work was conducted at the tactical level leading to a decline in managerial interest.
7. Some OR/MS practitioners had harmed their cause as a result of arrogance, poor communication skills and ineffective marketing of their skills.
There is clearly a significant interface between Geoffrion's observations and the findings of the OR Society's SSOR project. But in both cases, the current state and future of OR was defined primarily in relation to the ongoing demise of central OR groups in corporate industry. As indicated above, this was bound to raise concerns about the future practice of OR. But it can be argued with equal veracity that a focus on the fate of internal OR groups did not present an accurate reflection of OR in practice. In this respect, there are two critical points. In the first instance, both
Geoffrion and the authors of the SSOR project pointed to the 'democratisation' of OR as a result of the widespread diffusion of OR/MS based computer software leading to the loss of 'uniqueness' of central OR groups. It is a point well taken that this process served to exacerbate 'the lack of branding' of the OR profession. As [Ops Res
Associate Editor] has pointed out, at the beginning of the twenty first century OR is in fact undertaken under a blizzard of different names. They include synonyms and near-synonyms (eg., management science, decision technology, operations analysis, analytics), names of OR specialities in particular applications (eg., financial engineering, marketing engineering, operations management)….While the medical profession guarantees that all their practitioners regardless of speciality are recognized to be doctors, within the umbrella medical profession, OR lacks assured identification of practitioners with its umbrella profession (Associate Editor, Oper. Res. 2005) .
In this light, investigation of the state of OR in practice is bound to be compromised by the 'embarrassment of riches in names' leading to underestimates of the true numbers of practitioners. A related point, strongly articulated by Ormerod, and applicable to both British and American experience, is that the movement away from internal groups in favour of external consultancy and dispersed practitioners has been the product of changes in the pattern of work. This can be explained by the application of transactions cost economics and agency theory. In borrowing from the literature of applied economics, Ormerod has commented as follows:
In choosing whether to maintain an internal OR group or whether to use external agencies, an organisation has to determine whether the purchase and transaction costs of using external services (for instance, the costs of buying, selling and managing the contract) outweigh the production and agency costs of maintaining an internal group of relevant expertise. At the same time they have to take into account the quality of the internal and external services as they see them. They also have to weigh up the merits of using internal advisors with employment contracts, with the loyalty and goal alignment that it is assumed this ensures, against the merits of using external providers controlled through explicit principal agent relationships and contracts. As these factors are not easily quantified, the choices have to be made on the basis of subjective views (Ormerod, 1998) .
As Ormerod has commented in his most recent contribution on this theme, these developments in favour of 'the more commercially oriented service providers and consultants is an uncomfortable one for many members of the [OR] profession', bearing in mind that the opponents of commercialisation are heavily concentrated in university OR departments (Ormerod, 2002) .
CONCLUSION
This paper has presented a survey of the post-1970 debates on the future trajectory of OR in the specifically British context, whilst drawing points of contrast and comparison with experience in the US. Its main thrust has been to identify the standpoint of the mainly academic reformist and revolutionary challengers to the continuing relevance of the classical paradigm. This served as a precursor to an evaluation of their perception of OR in practice. As the paper has argued, the more extreme critics were guilty of portraying a distorted view of OR in practice insofar as much of the critique was rooted in time-specific circumstances. For the British reformers and advocates of 'soft' OR, there were criticisms of the classical paradigm, but there was always recognition of their essential complementarity. This stands in marked contrast to Ackoff's comprehens ive rejection of the classical paradigm. But notwithstanding the views of the British reformers, survey evidence points to the fact that although their methodological approach made headway in academic OR, the impact on the practitioner community was, and remains limited. As for the contrasts and comparisons with contemporary American experience, the paper has emphasized that there was nothing comparable in the US to the British revolutionaries: concerns were certainly expressed about the limited practical relevance of the classical paradigm, but in overall terms, the impact of soft OR both on academia and practice was even less noticeable than in Britain.
